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Abstract
This study investigates how the introduction of a competitor affects the behavior of
an incumbent electricity producer who is a former local monopolist. We especially focus
on its implications for the incumbent’s capacity choice between two different electric power
sources: one technology with a relatively high production cost (peak-load technology), which
is represented by gas-fired power generation, and the other with a relatively high capacity-
building cost (base-load technology), which is represented by nuclear power generation. We
assume that the entrant does not have access to the latter technology and also that demand
fluctuates over time, as is typically the case with an electricity market. Surprisingly, the
introduction of a competitor increases the capacity of nuclear power generation if and only if
the nuclear technology is sufficiently inefficient. This result also implies that the competition
tends to decrease the nuclear capacity when the level of carbon tax, which tends to raise the
relative production cost of gas-fired power generation, is sufficiently high.
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Almost all nuclear power plants in Japan stopped operating following the Fukushima-Daiichi
nuclear plant accident, which was triggered by the Great East-Japan Earthquake in March 2011.
If left unused, most existing nuclear plants in Japan will become too obsolete to be retrofitted
by the middle of this century. At the same time, it would require substantial spending for old
nuclear power plants to be replaced with ones that are compliant with much stricter current
regulations (The Mainichi, 2019). Together with heightened safety concerns, the expected high
costs of operationalizing nuclear power plants on a significant scale and its potential effects of
doing so on environmental and other social issues, such as climate change, have made nuclear
power one of the most hotly debated subjects in the political arena as well as in the news media
in Japan.
Besides nuclear power, there is a variety of other technologies available for electricity provi-
sion. Notable examples include coal-fired, gas-fired, hydro-electric, biomass power, wind-power,
and solar photovoltaic generations. The choice of technologies for electricity production de-
pends on economic as well as technological, environmental, and social considerations. From an
economic viewpoint, market demand and cost structures of the respective technologies are espe-
cially important. Demand for electricity fluctuates between day and night,1 and among seasons.
In addition, there are significant fluctuations and uncertainty in electricity demand induced by
such factors as states of an economy and weather-related events. Once a large-scale plant using
a technology such as nuclear and hydro-electric power is established, there is little cost-saving
possibility even if the quantity of electricity supplied to consumers turns out to be below its
production capacity. On the other hand, technologies such as gas-fired and biomass power gen-
erations yield immediate cost savings when the inputs necessary for electricity production are
reduced.
Thus, in order to choose its own cost-minimizing mix of production technologies, a power
company uses a more easily adjustable technology (typically referred to as a peak-load technol-
ogy), such as gas-fired power generation, to cope with the volatile part of the demand, and a
1Allcott (2011) estimates electricity demand under fluctuating demand structure.
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more rigid technology (a base-load technology), such as nuclear power, plays a central role in
providing for a base portion of the demand. This study starts by focusing on a local monopo-
list’s profit-maximizing motive and discusses its optimal selection of two different electric power
sources, gas-fired and nuclear (adjustable and rigid) power generation technologies.2
Since around the 1990s, regional electricity markets in Japan have transformed from local
monopolies to more competitive markets, and the shares of new entrants in formerly monopolized
regional electricity markets are gradually increasing across the country. The overall share of
new entrants reached 16.2% of the national electricity market in April 2020 (Electricity and Gas
Market Surveillance Commission, 2020), and this deregulation trend appears to have accelerated
after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant accident.
In the main part of the study, therefore, we investigate how the introduction of competition
affects the behavior of electricity producers and discuss its implications for the resulting capacity
choice of different electric power sources. In particular, we consider a case in which a new
competitor enters a market (and creates a duopoly market) that was originally served by a
local monopolist. We suppose that, while the incumbent firm can use both adjustable and rigid
technologies in its electricity production, the entrant does not have access to the latter technology
that requires a substantial capacity-building cost,3 represented here by nuclear power generation.
As our main finding, we show that relatively inefficient nuclear power generation technology,
measured by a sufficiently high cost for becoming operationalized, results in a larger capacity
of nuclear power generation than that under the monopoly environment. We also interpret our
results from the perspective of environmental policy and conclude that the nuclear capacity
tends to decrease with the introduction of a competitor when the level of carbon tax, which is
imposed on adjustable technology such as gas-fired power generation, is sufficiently high.
While this study is partially related to the real options theory, which accounts for the cost
of losing flexibility while investing under uncertainty (see, among others, Dixit and Pindyck,
2How the input of an ex ante control and that of an ex post control should be chosen are investigated by
Hartman (1976) for a competitive market, and Ishii (1979) for a monopoly market under uncertain demand. The
main finding of these works is that an ex ante “poor” choice could be partially adjusted by controlling ex post
inputs.
3Dixit (1979) demonstrates that the incumbent can create a situation in which a new entrant is inactive if
there is a sufficiently large fixed cost to enter the market.
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1994), we focus on strategic interactions by employing a game-theoretic approach typically used
in the industrial organization literature.4 In their seminal works, Spencer and Brander (1992)
consider a trade-off between flexibility and strategic pre-commitment by introducing demand
uncertainty in a Stackelberg model, and Boyer and Moreaux (1997) investigate how technological
flexibility choices depend on strategic interactions and industry characteristics in a duopoly
model. A relsult closely related to our study is presented by Goyal and Netessine (2007),
who analyze both the equilibrium technology choice and capacity investment in a multi-market
duopoly model.5 One of their main findings is that, as the competitor’s cost of capacity building
decreases and thus, as the competition intensifies, the other firm favors a more costly but flexible
production process. Our study differs from these previous works in that we examine the effects
of a competitor’s market entry on the technology choice, which is based on capacity investment
of an incumbent firm. Moreover, we obtain a contrasting result to Goyal and Netessine (2007),
in that, when competition intensifies, an incumbent firm can increase the use of a less costly but
inflexible production technology (base-load technology).
The underlying economic model employed in this study is most closely related to the two-
stage game proposed by Milstein and Tishler (2012), which considers the capacity/technology
choice under demand fluctuations in the initial stage of the game and examines the economic
implications of the subsequent Cournot competition with two contrasting power-generation tech-
nologies.6 They show that underinvestment in generation capacity realizes due to the rational
behaviors of the firms and also that the electricity price spike occurs as an effective substitute
for the firms’ accumulating excess generation capacities. Whereas we adopt a similar modeling
framework, the focus of our study is substantially different from that of Milstein and Tishler
4Cardell et al. (1997) analyze strategic interactions in electricity transmission networks.
5They consider two products and define the flexible (inflexible) technology as that whose capacity can be used
for both the products (must be used for one of the products).
6An economic model of optimal capacity choice under demand fluctuations in a game-theoretic context has
been developed steadily over the last twenty years or so. With regards to the ones adopting Cournot competition,
Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) investigate the characteristics of a subgame perfect equilibrium of a capacity
building game between two symmetric firms under demand uncertainty with finite discrete states. Murphy and
Smeers (2005) extend the setting to an asymmetric Cournot model with one firm which builds and operates
only base plants and the other firm which builds and operates only peak plants, and derive its subgame perfect
equilibrium. Tishler et al. (2008) investigate capacity choice of multiple Cournot firms under demand uncertainty
with a continuous density function assuming a single technology, and Milstein and Tishler (2012) extend this
model by incorporating two technologies.
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(2012) in that we analytically examine how an intensified competition affects the capacity-
investment choice of an incumbent firm and especially how it is associated with the relative
efficiencies of different technologies.7
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up our economic model. Section
3 investigates the case of monopoly. Section 4 analyzes the case of duopoly and identifies the
effects of introducing a competitor by comparing the results with those in the monopoly case.
Section 5 reinterprets our main results and discusses the implications of imposing a carbon tax
on fossil-fuel-oriented electricity. Section 6 provides simulation results of our model, focusing on
the equilibrium market shares of electricity generated by nuclear technology and the resulting
operation rates of a nuclear plant. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a local electricity market. We suppose that there are two different types of technologies
that produce electric power of a homogeneous quality. Specifically, these are referred to as a
nuclear power plant and a gas-fired power plant.8 A nuclear power plant incurs a higher capacity-
building (or set-up, or operationalizing) cost than a gas-fired power plant does while a gas-fired
power plant incurs a higher marginal production cost. In the benchmark case presented in the
next section, the market is monopolistically served by firm 1. With the entry of firm 2, the
market becomes duopolistic, and the two firms essentially play the following sequential game:
(i) the capacities of the power plants are determined under demand uncertainty; (ii) the actual
demand is revealed; and finally (iii) the firms choose the quantities of electricity supplies.
For the sake of analytical tractability, we make the following simplifying assumptions. Sup-
pose that firm 1 chooses the capacity of its nuclear power plant, k1 ∈ R+, and that firm 1 chooses
the total capacity of its gas-fired power plants, ℓ1 ∈ R+ (and firm 2 also chooses ℓ2 ∈ R+ in the
duopoly case).9 The capacity-building cost of the nuclear plant is given by rk1, where r > 0,
7As for the effects of competition in the electricity industry, see also Borenstein et al. (2000, 2002).
8In a different context, a nuclear power plant would be replaced by, e.g., a hydro-electric power plant, and a
gas-fired power plant would be replaced by a coal-fired, oil-fired, or biomass power plant.
9Note that only the incumbent firm (or firm 1) can use nuclear power technology, and therefore, k2 = 0 in the
duopoly case. Furthermore, we ignore inter-temporal considerations to focus on the steady-state outcomes, and
the capacity of a nuclear plant is measured in terms of the amount of electricity that the plant can produce in
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while the capacity-building cost of the gas-fired plant is assumed to be 0. The inverse demand
of the local electricity market is given by p = A−Q, where p is the market price and Q is the
quantity of electricity demanded in the market. The scale of the market, A, is a random variable
that follows a uniform distribution with the support of a positive-valued interval, [L,H],10 and
the exact size of A is revealed after the firms have made their capacity choices. Finally, after
observing A, firm 1 chooses the volume of electricity produced from the nuclear power plant,
x1(A) ∈ [0, k1], and the volume produced from gas-fired power generation, y1(A) ∈ [0, ℓ1] (in
the duopoly case, firm 2 also chooses y2(A) ∈ [0, ℓ2]). Thus, firm 1’s aggregate supply is given
by q1(A) = x1(A) + y1(A) (and firm 2’s total supply is simply q2(A) = y2(A)). Noted that,
since demand is revealed after the capacities are established and before the market clears, the
firms’ decisions on the quantities of their electricity supply depend on the actual value of A, but
their capacities do not. For simplicity, we suppose that the variable production cost of a nuclear
power plant is 0 while that of a gas-fired power plant is given by cyi(A) for firm i(i = 1, 2),
where c = c0+ t > 0. Since some carbon tax may be imposed on the fossil fuel, we suppose that
the overall marginal cost of the gas-fired power c is composed of a unit carbon tax, t ≥ 0, and
the marginal production cost, c0 > 0. Note that, in the final quantity-setting stage, the firms
can adjust these variable costs while the capacity-building cost is considered sunk.
We use a subgame-perfect equilibrium as our equilibrium concept and solve the game back-
wards. Since the set-up cost of a gas-fired plant’s capacity is 0, firm i always chooses a sufficiently
large value of ℓi so that yi(A) is not bounded from above by ℓi in any subgame-perfect equilib-
rium. Thus, ℓi becomes irrelevant to the other aspects of the equilibrium.
Furthermore, we adopt the following three assumptions, which turn out to be convenient for









10The assumption of uniform distribution is principally for the tractability of the analysis, but it would not be
significantly divergent from actual cases. For instance, Figure 2.1 of Léautier (2018) shows that the load duration
curve for France in 2009 generally reflects such a distribution. Tishler et al. (2008) and Milstein and Tishler
(2012) also adopt a uniform distribution in the analytical parts of their papers.
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A.1 allows us to restrict our attention to the case in which demand is sufficiently volatile.11 In
fact, A.1 is the condition to exclude the case in which firm 1 does not supply a positive amount
of gas-oriented power in any situations that satisfy the next two assumptions.12 According to
A.2, for all the conceivable scales of the market demand, nuclear power production technology
is more efficient than gas-fired power generation technology in terms of production in the steady
state, provided that a nuclear plant has no idle capacity. A.3 is the condition that does not
allow firm 1 to become a monopolist whenever there is a potential rival firm in the same market.
3 Monopoly
In this section, as a benchmark case, we consider firm 1 as the sole supplier of electricity in a
local market.13 Firm 1 can utilize both nuclear and gas-fired power generation technologies for
producing electricity. We suppose that the price of the electricity is endogenously determined
within the market.14
3.1 Quantity-setting stage
In the final quantity-setting stage, firm 1’s profit maximization problem,
max
x1,y1
pq1 − cy1 s.t. x1 ≤ k1,
11Since V ar(A) = (H−L)2/12, A.1 is equivalent to 2H > 3L+2c. This condition is always satisfied if H ≥ 2L,
for instance, holds alongside with A.3. This condition and A.3 imply that H > 4c.
12Specifically, this is the necessary and sufficient condition for both firms to have interior solutions in terms
of generating gas-fired power for some r ∈ (0, c) in Section 4, and the sufficient condition for the monopolist in
Section 3.
13The monopoly case can also be regarded as a collusive outcome in which firms 1 and 2 decide their aggregate
production capacities to maximize their joint profit.
14In reality, the electricity price charged by a local monopolist is often subject to a regulation. Even if we
consider a price-regulated monopolist as a benchmark case, our main result still holds (see Appendix B). In order
to focus on the issues of technology choice through capacity investment, we does not consider further complex
pricing methods for electricity. See Allcott (2011) for hourly real-time pricing and Daruwala et al. (2020) for
menu pricing to allow household self-selection.
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The superscript “m” represents the equilibrium of each outcome in this monopoly market.
As is seen in (1), firm 1’s optimal production plan has three distinct patterns. If the scale
of demand is sufficiently large in relation to a nuclear plant’s capacity, that is, if A > 2k1 + c,
then gas-fired power generation technology is utilized to make up for the shortage of a nuclear
plant’s capacity. If the scale of demand is small enough to satisfy A ≤ 2k1+ c, all the electricity
in the market is supplied by nuclear power technology. Moreover, when the scale of demand, A,
is smaller than 2k1, the nuclear plant ends up having idle capacity, that is, k1 > x
m
1 (k1;A).
From (1) and (2), we can compute the monopolist’s profit excluding the capacity-building




4 + ck1 if k1 ∈ [0,
A−c
2 ] ⇔ A ∈ [2k1 + c,∞),
k1(A− k1) if k1 ∈ [A−c2 ,
A
2 ] ⇔ A ∈ [2k1, 2k1 + c],
A2
4 if k1 ∈ [
A
2 ,∞) ⇔ A ∈ (0, 2k1].
15Note that, from the assumption A.3 above, we have an interior solution with respect to q1 for all A ∈ [L,H].
16πm1 (k1;A) is a smooth function with respect to k1.
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3.2 Capacity-setting stage
In the initial capacity-setting stage, the firm establishes the capacity of a nuclear power plant
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0 if k1 ∈ [H2 ,∞).
(4)
The curve ABCD in Figure 1 depicts the shape of this expected marginal revenue.
As Figure 1 suggests, firm 1’s expected marginal revenue, MRm(k1), is continuous and
decreasing with respect to plant size. Since MRm(k1) is strictly decreasing in the interval of
(0, c) and r ∈ (0, c) under A.2, the first-order condition,
MRm(k1) = r,
is the necessary and sufficient condition for the expected profit maximization problem of (3). In
other words, the curve ICD is the demand curve for a nuclear plant’s capacity k1 if we consider
r as the price of the capacity. Solving the last equation for k1 yields the optimal capacity of the
nuclear power plant for the monopolist as follows:
17We provide a supplementary material that helps readers to replicate the computation of (4).
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2 ), respectively (IJ, JK, and KD in Figure 1, respectively). From this




1 (H) > 0 while y
m
1 (L) is always zero. In other words,
unless the nuclear plant is sufficiently efficient, gas-fired power generation technology is utilized
when the market demand turns out to be high while nuclear power generation always serves the
base-load portion of the demand.
In building up the capacity of a nuclear power plant, firm 1 faces a trade-off between saving
its production cost and hedging against risk. If the demand is not so volatile, the firm would
prefer to generate electricity from nuclear power, since this mode of production is less costly
than gas-fired power generation, as in A.2. However, under uncertain demand, it is risky to
build a nuclear plant with an enormous capacity, because a part of its capacity can end up being
excessive when demand turns out to be fairly low. The cost of building up this excess capacity
cannot be recovered, as it is already sunk when the actual demand size is revealed. Gas-fired
power plants are expected to play a role in high demand cases unless the value of r is sufficiently
small to dwarf the cost consideration in comparison with this risk-hedge aspect.









which implies that, when Var(A) is sufficiently large, gas-fired power generation technology is
utilized even for a lower value of r.18 A high capacity-building cost of a nuclear plant reduces
the cost advantage of nuclear power generation. Similarly, a higher volatility of market demand
18Note that, since ym1 (A) is non-decreasing in A by (1), y
m
1 (A) = 0 for all A ∈ [L,H] if ym1 (H) = 0.
10
enhances the risk of increasing the capacity of a nuclear plant. Thus, the values of r and Var(A)
have similar effects in the nuclear capacity consideration, and their increases discourage the
establishment of a nuclear power plant of a significant scale.
4 Effects of competition
In this section, we analyze the case in which firm 2 enters the electricity market as a new
competitor to firm 1. We suppose that, whereas firm 1 can use both nuclear and gas-fired power
plants, firm 2 can employ only gas-fired power generation technology in its electricity production.
4.1 Quantity-setting stage
If all the electricity in the market is produced at gas-fired power plants, firm i’s reaction function
in the final quantity-setting stage is obtained by maxqi pqi − cqi as




where i = 1, 2 and i ̸= j. However, if all of firm 1’s electricity supply is produced at its nuclear
power plant, its reaction function in this stage is obtained by maxq1 pq1 as




Thus, since x1 ≤ k1, firm 1’s reaction function given k1 and A is
R1(q2; k1, A) =

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−1
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As Figure 2 shows, firm 1’s reaction function (the bold line) has kinks at the predetermined
maximum capacity of its nuclear power plant, k1.
Since firm 2 cannot use nuclear power generation technology, firm 2’s reaction function is
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always given by RF2 (q1;A). The Nash equilibrium outcomes for given k1 and A are obtained at
the intersection of these two reaction functions as follows:19
If k1 ∈ [0, A−c3 ] ⇔ A ∈ [3k1 + c,∞),x∗1(k1;A) y∗1(k1;A)
· y∗2(k1;A)
 =
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 , p∗(k1;A) = A+ c
3
. (8)
Similarly to the monopolist problem in the previous section, firm 1’s equilibrium production
plan is differentiated into three distinct cases. When A > 3k1 + c (high-demand case), firm 1
utilizes gas-fired power plants. Otherwise, firm 1 utilizes only nuclear power; when 3k1 + c >
A > 3k1 − c (intermediate case), firm 1’s nuclear power plant is at full operation; but when
A < 3k1 − c (low-demand case), the firm ends up with idle capacity. Note that in any of the
three cases, firm 2 always produces some electricity by using gas-fired power technology.
From these results, for given values of k1 and A, we obtain firm 1’s profit excluding the cost
19Note that, from A.3, we have an interior solution with respect to q1 and q2 for all A ∈ [L,H].
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4.2 Capacity-setting stage







π∗1(k1; a)da− rk1. (9)
Let k∗1 be the solution to this problem; that is, the equilibrium capacity of its nuclear plant
under the duopoly with a new entrant.
Given H−c3 >
L+c









































if k1 ∈ [H−c3 ,
H+c
3 ],
0 if k1 ∈ [H+c3 ,∞].
(10)
The curve ABEFCG in Figure 1 depicts the shape of this expected marginal revenue.
As Figure 1 shows, although the expected marginal revenue increases above c at first, it is
continuous and strictly decreasing when MR∗(k1) is in the interval of (0, c). Therefore, by A.2,
the first-order condition,
MR∗(k1) = r, (11)
20π∗1 is not differentiable but it is continuous in k1.
21We provide a supplementary material that helps readers to replicate the computation of (10).
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is the necessary and sufficient condition for the maximization problem in (9). In other words,
the curve MFCG in Figure 1 is firm 1’s demand curve for the capacity k1 in the presence of a
competitor. Solving it for k1 yields the following result:




2c if r ∈
[
















Proof See Appendix A.
If r is within the range of the first line of (12), k∗1 ∈ [L+c3 ,
H−c
3 ] (MF in Figure 1), and, if r
is within the range of the second line of (12), k∗1 ∈ [H−c3 ,
H+c
3 ] (FG in Figure 1). Therefore, by
(6), y∗1(H) > 0 if and only if r > c−
c(2H−3L−2c)
3(H−L) .
22 In other words, gas-fired power generation
technology is used to meet high demand when the nuclear power plant is not sufficiently efficient.
Again, the threshold value of r is obtained as














Thus, if Var(A) increases while preserving the mean E (A), gas-fired power plants are utilized
even with a lower value of r.23 This is because increasing the capacity of a nuclear plant,
while lowering the unit production cost, implies heightened exposure to the risk of carrying idle
capacity, similar to the case of a monopolist in the previous section.
4.3 Comparison
The following proposition summarizes how the entry of firm 2 changes the capacity of a nuclear
power plant when compared to the monopoly case. The equilibrium capacity of a nuclear
power plant expands under competition if and only if the nuclear plant is sufficiently inefficient
22This value is strictly smaller than c because 2H − 3L− 2c > 0 by A.1.
23Note that since y∗1(A) is non-decreasing in A by (6)–(8), y
∗
1(A) = 0 for all A ∈ [L,H] if y∗1(H) = 0.
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(r > r̂).24
Proposition 1 Suppose A.1–A.3. Then, there exists r̂ ∈ (0, c) such that
k∗1 ⋚ km1 ⇔ r ⋚ r̂.
Proof See Appendix A.
Surprisingly, when a new entrant is introduced to the market, nuclear power generation
technology increases its overall presence provided that it is sufficiently inefficient. The source
of this capacity expansion is a strategic effect against a new competitor, which arises due to
the relative cost structures of the nuclear and gas-fired power generation technologies. Since a
nuclear plant has a lower marginal production cost in the quantity-setting stage, by raising its
capacity, firm 1 can effectively commit itself to a larger production level and deter the production
of its competitor (firm 2). This strategic effect encourages firm 1 to develop a larger capacity
of its nuclear plant.25 However, the introduction of a competitor into the market also has an
opposing effect. A new entrant competes for a part of the electricity demand in a duopoly
market, and this effect alone reduces the capacity of a nuclear power plant of the incumbent
(firm 1). In other words, production substitution from firm 1 to firm 2 discourages firm 1 from
increasing the capacity of its nuclear plant.26
Why does the former strategic effect (positive effect) dominate the latter production substi-
tution effect (negative effect), particularly when the nuclear plant is sufficiently inefficient? The
intuition behind this result is as follows. When r is sufficiently large (r > r̂), according to the
trade-off between cost saving and risk management, only a small portion of firm 1’s electricity
24If A.1. is violated, that is, Var(A) ≤ (L+ 2c)2/48, it is possible to have k∗1 < km1 for all r ∈ (0, c). However,
even in such a case, if we suppose r > c, we have k∗1 > k
m




1 = 0 holds. This
is because, when r > c, unless r is extremely high, a nuclear plant is built under duopoly in order to deter firm
2’s production (indeed, we have a region where MR∗(k1) > c). If r > c, no nuclear plant is established under
monopoly, since it has no cost advantage but simply exposes the firm to the risk of carrying an idle capacity.
25This strategic effect is essentially the same as the entry deterrence effect of cost-reducing investment studied
in Dixit (1980). The investment cost and associated reduction in the marginal production cost in Dixit (1980)
corresponds to the relatively high set-up cost and relatively low production cost of a nuclear power plant in our
context.
26For the general principle of production substitution, see Lahiri and Ono (1988).
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r large (r > r̂) small (r < r̂)
strategic effect ++ +
production substitution effect − −−
total effect + −
Table 1: Effects of competition on nuclear capacity
supply is produced by nuclear power technology under a monopoly to begin with. Then, after
the entry, an increase in firm 1’s nuclear capacity deters firm 2’s production more effectively
than the case in which a large portion has already been produced by nuclear power because of
a smaller r. Hence, the positive strategic effect is relatively large (represented by double + in
Table 1) when r is larger. By contrast, the negative effect of production substitution is relatively
small (represented by single − Table 1) when nuclear power is a small portion of firm 1’s power
source. This is because the production substitution effect contributes to a reduction of firm
1’s nuclear capacity only when its electricity supply produced by nuclear power is replaced by
firm 2’s supply produced by gas-fired power. When gas-fired technology is utilized on a large
scale, the production substitution effect does not have a significant effect on the nuclear capac-
ity. Therefore, when r is sufficiently large, the former positive strategic effect is more likely to
dominate the negative effect of production substitution (represented by single + of total effect
in Table 1). In the opposite case, where r is sufficiently small (r < r̂), the negative production
substitution effect overwhelms the positive strategic effect, as shown in the second column of
Table 1.
5 Environmental implications
In the presence of a carbon tax, the marginal production cost, c, is considered to be comprised
of two components: c0, which is the marginal production cost by gas-fired technology, and t,
which is a unit tax imposed on carbon emissions (or equivalently, electricity production in our
model) by gas-fired power plants. In this section, we reinterpret the previous result with respect
to the level of c above, and discuss environmental implications of imposing a carbon tax, in view
of c = c0 + t.
In particular, we find that the nuclear capacity tends to decrease with the introduction of
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a competitor when the prevailing level of carbon tax is sufficiently high, as in the following
proposition.27
Proposition 2 Suppose A.1–A.3. Then, there exists ĉ ∈ (0, L/2) such that
k∗1 ⋚ km1 ⇔ c ⋛ ĉ.















Proof See Appendix A.
An imposition of a high tax on gas-originated electricity may seem to give a competitive
advantage to nuclear power generation technology. However, the capacity of a nuclear plant
actually decreases when the incumbent anticipates a competitor’s entry for a sufficiently high
level of carbon tax. In fact, Proposition 2 is a straightforward extension of Proposition 1, which
states that the introduction of a competitor decreases nuclear capacity when r is relatively small
for a given level of c. In essence, the nuclear capacity shrinks with the entry when the difference
between c and r is sufficiently significant.
When a carbon tax has been implemented before the capacity of nuclear power is chosen, such
a tax has an additional influence upon the effects of competition in choosing the nuclear capacity.
In the circumstance where the level of the carbon tax is sufficiently significant relative to the
capacity-building cost of a nuclear power plant, an environmental issue associated with carbon
emissions is more pressing. Then, the government would welcome a shift from a carbon-emitting
technology to a carbon-free technology. However, when a market deregulation is anticipated or
taken place concurrently, the environmental performance of a carbon tax can be compromised
because the incumbent reduces its nuclear capacity especially in a case with a high level of the




As a caveat, the necessary and sufficient condition for inducing this result is indicated in the
latter part of this proposition, which requires that the capacity-building cost of a nuclear power
plant r, as well as the volatility of demand V ar(A), should not be too large. If the condition is
violated, it is possible that k∗1 never exceeds k
m
1 even for a high value of c.
6 Simulation
To obtain further insights from the implications of our model, we conduct simple simulation
analyses of two numerical examples: a case with low demand volatility (H = 4, L = 2, and
c = 0.4), and one with high demand volatility (H = 5, L = 1, and c = 0.4). The latter case has
a higher V ar(A) than the former while both cases share the same mean E(A) = 3.28
First, we discuss how the equilibrium management of the nuclear power plant is affected
by the marginal capacity cost and the demand volatility. Figure 3 shows how a change in the
value of r affects the expected market shares of electricity generated by nuclear power generation





































in the duopoly case. These results
can be understood based on the discussion of Lemma 1. As r becomes smaller, the expected
market share of the nuclear power generation increases, since gas-fired power plants tend to be
utilized at a smaller scale owing to the cost advantage of a nuclear power plant. Nonetheless,
the expected operating rate of the nuclear power plant decreases, since the firm cares less about
the risk of being saddled with excess capacity when r is relatively small. Demand volatility
accelerates these tendencies.
Next, we discuss how competition influences the use of nuclear power technology. We sum-
marize the simulation results of our two cases with high and low demand volatility in Fig-
ure 4. The graphs depict how much the respective equilibrium values under duopoly differ
from those under monopoly, that is, k∗ − km for the equilibrium capacity of the nuclear plant,





∗;A))− EA(xm1 (km;A)) for the expected nuclear power outputs, and so forth.
As Proposition 1 shows, competition increases the equilibrium capacity size of the nuclear
plant if and only if r is sufficiently large (top-left panel). Its threshold value, r̂, is lower in the
case with high demand volatility (r̂H in the figure) than in the case with low demand volatility
(r̂L in the figure).
The difference in the expected total outputs is always positive (top-right panel). Indeed, as
is typically the case with a standard duopoly model, we can analytically show that the expected














Note that this is true even when the capacity of a nuclear power plant shrinks.
To obtain a positive difference of the expected outputs generated by the nuclear power
technology, r must be higher than r̂ in both cases with high and low demand volatility (middle-
left panel). Because the new entrant steals a portion of business from the incumbent with a
nuclear plant, the output from the nuclear plant does not necessarily increase even when its
capacity expands (right-hand side of the dotted line). By contrast, the output of the nuclear
plant necessarily decreases if its capacity shrinks (left-hand side of the dotted line). Indeed, we








if k∗ < km.
Thus, from (13) and (14), if the capacity of a nuclear power plant under duopoly is smaller
than that under monopoly (k∗ < km), the market share of nuclear power generation necessarily
decreases (left-hand side of each dotted line in bottom-left panel). This implies that, when the
nuclear power generation technology is sufficiently efficient, introducing competition decreases
the market share of the nuclear technology as an electric power source.
29The formal proof is available upon request.
30The formal proof is available upon request.
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Even if k∗ > km, the market share of the nuclear power may not increase. This is because,
as mentioned above, competition always increases the total output, and at the same time can
decrease the output of the nuclear plant even when k∗ > km holds. For instance, in our case
with low demand volatility, the difference in the market shares of the nuclear power generation
is always negative regardless of the value of r (bottom-left panel). However, for our case with
high demand volatility, it is possible for nuclear power to increase its overall market share as a
power source when the nuclear power generation technology is sufficiently inefficient (bottom-left
panel).
7 Concluding remarks
In this study, we investigated how the introduction of a competitor affects the behavior of an
electricity producer and discussed its implications for the resulting market shares of different
electric power sources. Specifically, we considered the case in which a new competitor with
no access to technologies that require significant capacity-building cost, such as nuclear power,
enters a market that was originally served by a local monopolist. As our main result, we found
that a sufficiently high cost of operationalizing a nuclear power plant leads to larger capacity
for nuclear power generation in the duopoly case than in the monopoly environment. We also
reinterpreted this result from a perspective of environmental policy.
The cost of operationalizing a nuclear power plant is becoming significantly higher in Japan
especially because stricter regulations are being implemented in the wake of the Fukushima-
Daiichi accident in 2011 and opinions against nuclear power generation are gaining further
popularity in both the news media and political arenas. Our analysis suggests that this trend
may paradoxically lead to larger presence of nuclear power generation when the deregulation of
the local electricity market is anticipated. The deregulation of regional power markets in Japan
has been under way for quite some time now and has gained steam especially after the accident.
Furthermore, whereas the entry of a competitor into a formerly monopolized electricity
market always increases the consumer surplus in our context, our analytical findings would hint
at the possibility of welfare-worsening deregulation provided that the cost of developing a nuclear
20
power plant is sufficiently high. A full analytical investigation of welfare-related outcomes is left
for future research.31
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Proof of Lemma 2. First, note that MR∗(k1) ≥ c when k1 ≤ L+c3 , and also that
MR∗(k1) = 0 when k1 ≥ H+c3 . The former is true because MR
∗(k1) is quadratic and con-

















Therefore, we have k∗1 ∈ (L+c3
H+c
3 ) by A.2 and (11).
Next, observe that MR∗(k1) is strictly decreasing for k1 ∈ [L+c3 ,
H+c
3 ]. The decline of
MR∗(k1) for k1 ∈ [L+c3 ,
H−c




3 ] is implied by the
following three facts: (i) MR∗(k1) is quadratic and convex downward in k1 for k1 ∈ [H−c3 ,
H+c
3 ],
(ii) MR∗(H−c3 ) > 0, and (iii) MR
∗(H+c3 ) = 0. Note that MR
∗(H−c3 ) > 0 is induced from the









= c− c(2H − 3L− 2c)
3(H − L)
. (A.1)
Therefore, the second-order condition is globally satisfied for k1 ∈ [L+c3 ,
H+c
3 ].
From the third term in (A.1), MR∗(H−c3 ) < c by A.1, which is equivalent to 2H−3L−2c > 0
since Var(A) = (H−L)
2
12 . Hence, for r ∈ [MR
∗(H−c3 ), c), we have k
∗
1 ∈ (L+c3 ,
H−c
3 ] and for
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r ∈ (0,MR∗(H−c3 )], we have k
∗
1 ∈ [H−c3 ,
H+c
3 ). Notice that this is because MR
∗(k1) is strictly
decreasing for k1 ∈ [L+c3 ,
H+c
3 ]. Therefore, by substituting the expression (10) in each case,
solving the first-order condition (11) yields the result of Lemma 2. Q.E.D.












where the inequality holds by A.3. In other words, we have k∗1 < k
m
1 when r is sufficiently close












In other words, we have k∗1 > k
m
1 when r is sufficiently close to c. Hence, MR
m(k1) and MR
∗(k1)
intersect at least once on (0, c) by their continuity.
Thus, the proof is complete if MRm(k1) and MR
∗(k1) intersect exactly at a single point on
(0, c) (see figure 1). In terms of absolute values, (i) the slope of MRm(k1) is smaller than or
equal to 2cH−L for all k1 by (4) and (ii) the slope of MR





3 by (10). Observe that (i) is true since the slope of MR
m(k1) equals − 2cH−L when
k1 ∈ (L2 ,
H−c































where (A.2) holds for k1 ∈ (L−c2 ,
L




2 ). Notice that the
inequalities of (A.2) and (A.3) hold because MRm(k1) is decreasing, and quadratic functions
convex upward and downward in respective regions. Furthermore, we observe that (ii) is true
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for k1 ∈ (H−c3 ,
H+c
3 ). Notice that the first inequality holds because MR
∗(k1) is a quadratic
function convex upward and decreasing for k1 ∈ (H−c3 ,
H+c
3 ) and that the final inequality holds
since A.1 and A.3 imply that H > 4c. Moreover, if the slopes of both MR∗(k1) and MR
m(k1)











by (10) and (4). Hence, MR∗(k1) and MR
m(k1) never intersect at more than one point. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. We start by explicitly deriving r̂ provided in Proposition 1. In
Figure 1, this threshold is obtained as the level of r at intersection C. Let the corresponding
level of k1 at this threshold be k̂. From (A.5), we have already seen that the intersection never
lies above point F in the figure. Moreover, when r = c2/2(H −L), by Lemmas 1 and 2, we have










≡ F (H, c) > 0.
Here, the positivity is obtained from H > 4c by A.1 and A.3 as well as F (4c, c) > 0, and
∂F/∂H > 0 for H > 4c. Thus, MRm and MR∗ must intersect when MRm (MR∗) is in the
case in which k1 ∈ [L2 ,
H−c




3 ]). Thus, by solving MR
m = MR∗ in these cases,
we obtain k̂ = (2(H − c) −
√
α)/3, where α = (H − c)2 − 6c2. Note that α > 0 by H − c > 3c










In the following, we show the requested result by applying this expression of r̂ to Proposition
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In addition, the value within the second parentheses in the numerator is smaller than
√
(H − c)2−
2(H + 2c) = −H − 5c < 0. Thus,
∂r̂
∂c
⋚ 0 ⇔ 5c−H ⋛ 0. (A.6)


















Then, because of the single peaked property of r̂(c), we have r ≤ r̂(H/5), and r̂(c) is strictly
increasing in c ∈ (0,H/5]. Thus, by also noting r > r̂(0) = 0,
∃ĉ ∈ (0,H/5], ∀c ∈ (0,H/5], r̂(c) ⋛ r ⇔ c ⋛ ĉ. (A.7)
Furthermore, L/2 > H/5 implies that for c ∈ (H/5, L/2), r̂(c) > r̂(L/2) ≥ r by (A.6). From
this and (A.7), we obtain
∃ĉ ∈ (0, L/2), ∀c ∈ (0, L/2), r̂(c) ⋛ r ⇔ c ⋛ ĉ. (A.8)
By Proposition 1, r̂(c) ⋛ r in (A.8) is equivalent to k∗1 ⋚ km1 , which is the requested result.
Next, suppose that r ≤ r̂(L/2) and L/2 ≤ H/5 (or, V ar(A) ≥ 9L2/48). Then, similarly to
(A.7), we obtain
∃ĉ ∈ (0, L/2], ∀c ∈ (0, L/2], r̂(c) ⋛ r ⇔ c ⋛ ĉ. (A.9)
In particular, when r < r̂(L/2), we have ĉ < L/2, and thus, the same result as (A.8) is obtained.
However, when r = r̂(L/2), we obtain ĉ = L/2. Hence, (A.9) implies that for all c ∈ (0, L/2),
we have r̂(c) < r, which gives k∗1 > k
m
1 by Proposition 1.
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Finally, suppose that r > r̂(L/2). Then, if there exists ĉ ∈ (0, L/2) such that r̂(c) > r for all
c ∈ (ĉ, L/2), r̂(L/2) ≥ r must hold by the continuity of r̂(c), which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
B Price-regulated monopolist
Here, we consider a case where the electricity price charged by a monopolist, firm 1, is capped
at p̄ ∈ [c, L]. The firm is obligated to meet all the demand under this regulated price.
B.1 Quantity-setting stage
In the production stage, firm 1 must supply q̄1(A) = A − p̄, but they can choose x1 and y1 to
minimize its variable cost:
min
x1,y1
0 · x1 + cy1 s.t. x1 ≤ k1, x1 + y1 = q̄1(A)
The equilibrium outcomes for given k1 and A are as follows.
(x̄1(k1;A), ȳ1(k1;A)) =

(k1, A− p̄) if k1 ∈ [0, A− p̄] ⇔ A ∈ [k1 + p̄,∞)
(A− p̄, 0) if k1 ∈ [A− p̄,∞) ⇔ A ∈ (0, k1 + p̄]
Note that in both cases, q1 = A−p̄ and p = p̄ due to the price regulation. Then, the monopolist’s
profit without the set-up cost of capacities is given by
π̄1(k1;A) =

(p̄− c)(A− p̄) + ck1 if k1 ∈ [0, A− p̄] ⇔ A ∈ [k1 + p̄,∞)
(A− p̄)p̄ if k1 ∈ [A− p̄,∞) ⇔ A ∈ (0, k1 + p̄].
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B.2 Capacity-setting stage
In the capacity-setting stage, firm 1 maximizes the expected profit by choosing the capacity of







π̄1(k1; a)da− rk1. (B.1)
Let k̄1 be the solution of this problem, that is, the equilibrium capacity of the base-load tech-
nology in the monopoly market.









c if k1 ∈ [0, L− p̄]
1
H−L [c(H − p̄)− ck1] if k1 ∈ [L− p̄, H − p̄]
0 if k1 ∈ [H − p̄,∞)
(B.2)
Therefore, by A.2, the first order condition, M̄R(k1) = r, is the necessary and sufficient condition
for the problem (B.1).
We compare this regulated monopoly outcome with that of the deregulated duopoly that is
detailed in Section 4.




for all k1 such that M̄R(k1),MR
∗(k1) ∈ (0, c).
Proof In the proof of Proposition 1, we have already shown that, in terms of its absolute
value, the slope of MR∗ is larger than or equal to 2cH−L when MR
∗ ∈ (0, c) while the slope of
M̄R is equal to cH−L when M̄R ∈ (0, c) by (B.2). Q.E.D.
Thus, if the curves M̄R(k1) and MR
∗(k1) ever cross, they do so only once, and the simi-
lar relationship to Proposition 1 holds: an introduction of competition (accompanied by price
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deregulation) increases the capacity of a base-load technology if and only if r is sufficiently large.
As a caveat, we must note that M̄R(k1) and MR
∗(k1) do not necessarily cross because the
supply under the price regulation depends on the level of a regulated price. For instance, if the
regulated price is sufficiently low (close to c) and the obligated supply becomes sufficiently large,
it is possible that M̄R > MR∗ holds everywhere, and the capacity of a base-load technology









































Figure 1: Expected marginal revenue with respect to the nuclear plant’s capacity k1 (ABCD is
















Figure 2: Reaction function of firm 1 given its nuclear plant’s capacity k1
Figure 3: Equilibrium management of nuclear power (“Low volatility” simulates a case with low
demand volatility, and “High volatility” simulates a case with high demand volatility.)
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Figure 4: Effect of competition (The graphs depict how much the respective equilibrium values
under duopoly differ from those under monopoly.)
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